

**The State, Development, Democracy, and
Peace in Unrecognised Somaliland**

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Abstrak:

This study examines the national state-building experiment in Somaliland, an unrecognised state in the Horn of Africa, in the three decades after its independence from Somalia in 1991. There are three dimensions of national state-building in Somaliland discussed in this study, namely economic growth, political development (with a particular emphasis on democratisation), and peacebuilding. This study uses a qualitative-descriptive methodology, utilising previous studies and mass media publications to assess the role of the Somalilander state vis-à-vis those three dimensions. This study discovered that the Somalilander state and its government can be considered as a strong state. Furthermore, the Somalilander state has an instrumental role in encouraging economic growth by way of cooperation with national and foreign business interests, encouraging political development through a highly successful, novel method of democratisation and political institutionalisation through deliberation and consensus in cooperation with traditional and religious institutions present in the country's territory, and encourages peacebuilding within the country's territory by neutralising threats of terrorism and horizontal interclan conflict through inclusive state governance. This study also finds that the Somalilander government's role is central in uniting the various clans and armed militia groups of the country into unified state institutions, in a way that is absent in southern Somalia. Therefore, this study finds that the "Somalilander Way" as practiced by the Somalilander government for the past three decades is a good example for other states in the world coming out from conflicts.

Penelitian ini membahas usaha pembangunan negara di Somaliland, sebuah negara yang tidak diakui secara de jure oleh masyarakat internasional di kawasan Tanduk Afrika, setelah kemerdekaannya dari Somalia pada tahun 1991. Terdapat tiga dimensi pembangunan nasional yang sedang dilakukan di Somaliland yang dibahas dalam penelitian ini, yaitu pertumbuhan ekonomi, perkembangan politik (dengan titik berat utama pada demokratisasi), dan pembangunan perdamaian. Penelitian ini menggunakan metodologi kualitatif deskriptif, menggunakan penelitian-penelitian sebelumnya dan berbagai publikasi dalam media massa untuk menilai peran pemerintah Somaliland dalam ketiga dimensi tersebut. Penelitian ini menemukan bahwa negara Somaliland di dalam sistem pemerintahannya dapat disebut sebagai sebuah negara yang kuat. Pemerintah Somaliland juga memiliki peran yang sangat penting dalam mendukung pertumbuhan ekonomi melalui kerja sama dengan kepentingan bisnis nasional dan asing, mendukung perkembangan politik melalui metode demokratisasi dan pelembagaan politik yang sangat sukses dan unik melalui proses musyawarah dan mufakat dengan bekerjasama dengan lembaga-lembaga adat dan agama yang hadir dalam wilayah negara, dan mendorong pembangunan perdamaian dalam wilayah negara dengan cara membasmi ancaman terorisme dan konflik horizontal antarklan melalui tata pemerintahan negara yang inklusif. Penelitian ini juga menemukan bahwa peran pemerintah Somaliland sangat penting dalam mempersatukan berbagai klan dan kelompok milisi bersenjata ke dalam lembaga negara yang bersatu, suatu hal yang tidak ada di wilayah Somalia bagian selatan. Dengan demikian, penelitian ini menemukan bahwa "Somalilander Way" yang selama ini telah sukses diterapkan oleh

pemerintah Somaliland selama tiga dasawarsa merupakan contoh yang baik bagi negara-negara lain di dunia yang sedang beranjak keluar dari konflik

Kata Kunci:

Somaliland; democratisation; peacebuilding; development

Introduction

The Republic of Somaliland is a de facto sovereign state in the Horn of Africa, formed in 1991 after independence from Somalia following the fall of the Siad Barre regime and the commencement of Somalia's civil war. Despite the fact that it has been independent of Somalia in internal and, to a lesser extent, external affairs for over thirty years, Somaliland is still not recognised de jure by any other state in the world. Nonetheless, the Somalilander state has been recognised to be far more successful than other states in the region, including internationally recognised sovereign states: for example, Freedom House considers Somaliland to be the only democracy in the region, ranking it as 'partially free' in comparison to all other states in the region, which are considered 'not free' (Freedom House, 2023). Somaliland has also been successful in avoiding the chaos that has been prevalent in other regions of Somalia, and it is the only region in Somalia free of terrorist activities (Djounguep, 2022). Somaliland's success in promoting peace and prosperity can be attributed not to external factors, but to the successful establishment of a strong, resilient state through the establishment of institutions and unique democratic mechanisms designed to prevent conflict, while also maintaining good relations with neighbouring states (Kosienkowski, 2022).

This study will examine Somaliland's state-building history and practice, as well as how the country's current peace and prosperity are the results of strong state institutions and mechanisms. This study argues that a strong state, such as the Republic of Somaliland, is required to achieve growth, development, and peace in its territory. To accomplish this, this study begins by looking at the theoretical underpinnings of a "strong state," with a particular emphasis on Somaliland's status as a de jure unrecognised state. This study will next examine how the Somalilander state promotes growth, development, and peace in contrast to the internationally recognised government in Mogadishu and other 'state contenders' in the region's failures to establish peace and prosperity in within its borders. In the following parts, this study will highlight three indicators of Somaliland's success: economic growth as an outcome of the state's regulation of markets and its independence in the economy, its political development as a result of the institutionalisation of pre-existing religious and customary structures, and the establishment of peace as a result of cooperation between the Somalilander state and non-state actors and foreign countries. Finally, this study will conclude that the Somalilander state can be considered as a 'strong' state owing to the successful harnessing of traditional structures, the implementation of strong, institutionalised democratic systems, and the state's capability in maintaining order. Therefore, this study argues that a strong state capable of providing order, regulating the economy, and shaping society, as exemplified by Somaliland, is necessary to bring about growth, development, and peace.

The parameters of a 'strong' state are still strongly contested in academia, and for some, the term itself evokes images of Soviet Russia and Nazi Germany as the archetypes of 'strong states,' even though the term can be and has been employed in less sinister and

more positive ways. As a result, this study shall look at two definitions of a 'strong state': Stadler's (1992) and Tsygankov's (2015). According to Stadler, a strong (or, in his terminology, autonomous) state possesses three characteristics: it resists control from particular interests, it preserves the integrity of political structures against corruption, and it prevents authoritarianism and arbitrariness in government. He goes on to argue that a strong state is required to develop democracy and welfare, but the state's authority to do so comes first from the formation of civil society institutions, which in turn allows the state to legislate and coerce the behaviour of actors (Stadler 1992: 30).

Tsygankov (2015) proposes four elements of a 'strong state' in a similar vein: it assures internal political stability, economic growth, the possibility of social development, and it possesses the ability to mobilise resources to fulfil its aims. A strong state, according to Tsygankov, requires certain democratic mechanisms as a form of feedback between society and the elite, as well as sufficient administrative power to resist external pressure and special interest lobbies (Tsygankov, 2015: 3, Stadler, 1992: 29). A strong state must be able to regulate the elite through discourse, transforming non-cooperative elites into what Tsygankov refers to as "patriotic national elites" (Tsygankov, 2015: 7). Furthermore, the state must be able to define a long-term strategy for its development, establish reliable institutional mechanisms of engagement with society, invest in social programmes that do not impede business activities, and promote strong state values within its society (ibid: 7-8). However, Tsygankov asserts that the manner in which a state exerts its authority is dependent on its context and need not be identical with Western notions of liberal democracy (ibid: 5). Therefore, a state according to Tsygankov can be democratic in a non-Western way while keeping certain mechanisms necessary to receive feedback from its people for the purpose of political development and policy improvement.

Methodology

The primary methodological approach used in this study is a qualitative-descriptive one. The description narrative of the subject matter is drawn from academic works about the state's role in political development, economic growth, and peacebuilding. It also draws from mass media publications that represent public and scholarly opinions about the state's role in Somaliland's historical and current efforts to promote economic growth, democratisation, and peacebuilding. The goal of qualitative-descriptive research is to give an in-depth account of contemporary issues in a language which is easy for readers to comprehend (Sullivan-Bolyai, Bova, and Harper., 2005). In addition, identifying and understanding phenomenon (in this case, political phenomenon surrounding the state-building project in Somaliland) and the perspectives of those involved are the objectives of qualitative-descriptive researchers (Caelli et al., 2003). Finding the who, what, where, and why of events or experiences can be accomplished via a qualitative-descriptive approach (Neergaard et al., 2009). This renders the qualitative-descriptive method especially pertinent for practitioners and policy makers who wish to make an informed decision on the issues at hand (Sandelowski, 2000).

In reviewing the achievements of the Somalilander state, this study will therefore examine three fields where the Somalilander Government claims to have excelled:

economic advancement (or development), democratic governance, and peace and security (Somalilander Government, 2024).

Results and Discussion

The Somalilander State and Economic Development

The Somalilander state has been a key factor in the economic activities in its territory, creating regulations and establishing a business climate that is conducive to both local and foreign commercial interests. Musa and Horst (2019) investigated the relationship between state formation and economic development in post-war Somaliland, discovering that from the beginning of its history, the Somalilander state has been proactive in channelling what little economic activity present in its (at first) largely war-torn territory to benefit its people, in contrast to the rest of Somalia, where non-existent state structures prevented the state from adequately regulating markets and providing the security necessary to sustain a vibrant economy in the context of the chaos following the fall of the Barre regime. Learning from its brief civil war in 1991-1994, during which the strategic Berbera port was frequently held hostage by warlords and clan leaders, the reorganised Somalilander government has firmly established control over the Berbera port facilities and used its revenue (which by 2019 contributes 70% of Somalilander government revenue) to fund disarmament and demobilisation projects aimed at reintegrating clan militias into Somalilander society (Musa and Horst, 2019: 43). Through these disarmament and demobilisation efforts, the Somalilander state can therefore free up manpower from unofficial militia structures to be funnelled into the workforce in more economically beneficial sectors and activities.

Recognising the importance of local (particularly small and medium-sized) enterprises, which have grown exponentially since the end of the Somaliland Civil War in 1994, the Somalilander government has facilitated local economic interests and created favourable business regulations, resulting in a significant improvement in general living conditions and the accessibility of goods and services for the general population (ibid: 41). The Somalilander government additionally supported corporate interests to develop the Somalilander national economy by enacting de facto protectionist laws favourable to local enterprises and enabling private corporations to invest in government projects, resulting in increased economic growth in the country. Furthermore, the Somalilander government emphasises peaceful approaches of adjudicating inter-clan disputes over economic disputes of grazing rights and private property, which has been effective in keeping the country peaceful, in contrast with the rest of Somalia, where economic disputes often lead to armed conflict (ibid: 43). These state initiatives demonstrate that the Somalilander government is committed to ensuring economic growth in its territory, which is hoped to continue to develop alongside peacebuilding and state-building efforts.

Aside from encouraging local economic interests and fostering a pro-local business climate, the Somalilander state actively promotes foreign commercial interests and investments within the country's territory. Foreign corporations such as Coca Cola, DHL, and numerous monetary transfer companies have appeared in Somaliland as a result of special profit-sharing arrangements with local companies with the government's encouragement, with the latter facilitating remittances from Somalilanders abroad and generating revenue upwards of US\$ 500 million annually by 2002 (Ahmed, 2000). These

efforts show that aside from promoting local economic activities, the Somalilander government has successfully created a peaceful climate conducive to foreign business interests by making the country safe enough for foreign corporations to start business operations, in contrast with the very unsafe territory of Somalia which disincentivised foreign business penetration and cooperation with the country's already-poor domestic private sector.

The Somalilander government has also managed to attract direct foreign investment, most notably a US\$ 442 million investment in its principal port of Berbera from DP World (an Emirati multinational corporation) in 2016 (Musa and Horst, 2019: 45). By shifting ownership of the Berbera port from local, politically involved economic actors to a neutral, business-minded foreign enterprise, the Somalilander government has ensured a stable stream of income that is largely unaffected by any potential political unrest in the nation. Although Somaliland still has a long way to go before it can be considered as truly open to the global economy, the Somalilander government has done a remarkable job thus far of opening the country to foreign investment while also protecting local business interests, a feat unheard of for a completely unrecognised state. These examples demonstrate how the Somalilander government is capable of stimulating economic growth, levying taxes, and establishing peaceful mechanisms to resolve economic disputes in the country, which stands in stark contrast to the rest of Somalia, where economic regulations are non-existent and economic disputes frequently result in violence (Ingiriis, 2021: 16).

As of 2024, the efforts of the Somalilander Government have successfully brought them to what the government terms as "achievements against all the odds", with a higher GDP per capita and economic activity than many internationally-recognised states in the region (Somalilander Government 2024).

Patterns of Homegrown Democracy in Somaliland

Unlike other areas of Somalia, the Somalilander state has applied a distinct, home-grown method of democratisation and state-building even from its start. Ingiriis (2021) investigated the various trajectories of nation-building in Somaliland compared to southern Somalia. In this study, Ingiriis argued that the Somalilander nation-building project is comparatively more successful than the one in southern Somalia, despite the lack of international support or recognition, because Somaliland was able to institutionalise the traditional clan and religious structures (systems analogous to the Indonesian jurisprudential concept of *hukum adat*) that were suppressed during the Barre regime years and use them as building blocks for nation-building during the power vacuum that followed (Ingiriis, 2021: 4). Because of this use of traditional mechanisms, some scholars have labelled the Somalilander experiment in democracy as an example of 'illiberal state-building' (Egger, 2016). Learning from the southern Somalian government's failure to incorporate pre-existing clan structures into its state mechanism and preferring instead to import a Western-style liberal democracy, which resulted in the chronic administrative challenges faced by the southern Somalian state, the Somalilander government instead opted to incorporate customary and sharia laws into its state mechanisms, resulting in Somaliland's enduring peace and vibrant home-grown democracy that continues to this day (Richards, 2020: 1075).

Kaariye (2021) explored the dynamics of democracy in Somaliland, especially its use of deliberative democracy, traditional jurisprudence, and sharia (Islamic religious) law in day-to-day governance, as well as providing a traditional 'voice to parliament' in the form of the Council of Elders (Guurti), which forms the upper house of the Somalilander legislature. The coexistence between the Guurti and a multipartite, 'modern' parliament in Somaliland proves how traditional clan-based methods of deliberative democracy can coexist with 'modern' forms of electoral democracy in the region. Kaariye contended that incorporating traditional and religious (Islamic) aspects into the state's administration has resulted in a peaceful, flourishing democracy to develop organically in Somalilander society. Traditional deliberative democracy, in particular, was instrumental in bringing together various conflicting clans and uniting them under the umbrella of the Somalilander state, which would later result in a mixture of clan-based representation through the Guurti and a multiparty voting system, providing Somalilanders with two alternate means to voice their concerns and demand accountability from their government, thereby encouraging free expression and political freedoms in the country (ibid: 218). The participation of all clans in the Somalilander government in a power-sharing agreement through the Guurti also provided all clans with a means to amicably and peacefully resolve problems that would otherwise be resolved through violence (Ingiriis, 2021: 14).

Power-sharing among clans in the Somalilander government also ensures that all clans stand to benefit from keeping national stability in the country, thereby incentivizing interclan unity, as the clans are concerned that there might otherwise develop a Somalia-like situation in which the state does not recognise clan institutions, or worse, attempts to stomp them out, as was the case in the Barre regime (ibid: 15). Indeed, in some ways, the hybrid Guurti system in Somaliland (which, in practice, is akin to the Indonesian concept of deliberative democracy known as *musyawarah mufakat*) is comparatively more democratic than the ostensibly liberal system in use in southern Somalia, as the Guurti system is based on constant egalitarian participatory democracy with checks and balances present between clan elders and their stakeholders (diaspora groups, political parties, and clan members, among others), whereas the southern Somalian state's unwillingness to incorporate local stakeholders and traditional systems into its governance model inadvertently alienated many stakeholders and weakened the Somalian state so much so that some scholars have opined that the Somalian state itself has "disappeared as a political reality" (Brons, 2001: 158).

In short, where a forced liberal democracy to a large degree did not work in Somalia, a homegrown traditional 'hybrid' democracy flourished in Somaliland. While the ideal value of liberal democracy compared to a 'hybrid' (liberal parliamentary mixed with traditional deliberative) democracy itself is still heavily debated, it is undeniable that the 'liberal democracy' as written in the constitution and laws of Somalia only exist on paper alone and is completely absent in the contemporary reality of governance in Somalia, while the mixed 'hybrid' traditional democracy as practiced in Somaliland is alive, thriving, and is able to answer the very much modern issue of political development and democratisation in Somaliland. Most importantly, Somaliland's democracy has borne the fruit of political development for the Somalilander people. It can be argued, therefore, that a living democracy, no matter how conceptually different, is much better than a completely imaginary democracy, no matter how ideal it exists on paper. The effects of this divergence

between Somaliland's and Somalia's forms of democracy, as this study has thus far proven, is wide-ranging and far-reaching for the peoples of Somaliland and Somalia. The successful, dynamic implementation of the so-called 'traditional' deliberative democracy in contemporary Somaliland has been lauded by many scholars over the past three decades since Somaliland's independence and achievement of peace in its territory, so much so that Ingiriis (2021: 12) suggested that in Somaliland, "nothing is traditional inasmuch as everything follows the reality of the day".

The Somalilander State Creates Peace in Turmoil

Peacebuilding and democratisation in Somaliland are so intertwined that Ingiriis (2021: 4) argued that "to build peace in Somaliland (...) we must first build democracy." Somaliland's active democratic institutions uniquely constructed of liberal parliamentary and traditional deliberative components, utilisation of traditional participatory democratic procedures, and an effective constant checks and balances system have earned it the distinction as the sole democratic state completely surrounded by many authoritarian, undemocratic state in the Horn of Africa. Indeed, Somaliland is the only country listed by Freedom House's 2023 Democracy Index as "partly free", while all its neighbours: Ethiopia, Djibouti, and Somalia (along with the Arabian Peninsula across its waters on the Gulf of Aden) are listed as "not free" (Freedom House, 2023). Not only that, but Somaliland has become the only territory in Somalia free of terrorist attacks, while southern Somalia has been constantly attacked by Al-Shabaab terrorist attacks for the past decades (Djounguep, 2022). In explaining this state of tranquillity and peace that permeates Somaliland's territory, Ingiriis (2021: 4) went on to say that Somaliland is "an oasis of peace in a pool of bloodshed".

The Somalilander administration is very capable of maintaining peace in its jurisdiction that its residents may stroll freely in the streets and its politicians do not fear political assassination, a far cry from the scenes in Mogadishu, where Al-Shabaab bombings are an everyday occurrence and government buildings being one of their primary targets (ibid: 2, Keating, 2018). Somaliland's lasting peace stemmed from its bottom-up peacebuilding history, learning from the violent patterns of top-down coercion and control of the Barre dictatorship, which is currently still in use (and continuing to face numerous challenges) in southern Somalia (Ingiriis, 2021: 3). However, in this respect, the state is wholly accountable for maintaining peace within its territory because only the state can direct these bottom-up initiatives and utilise them to achieve national peace. Only the vibrant and large Somalilander state capacity (under President Egaal's administration), as Ingiriis (2021: 9) remarked, can persuade the numerous armed clan militias to peacefully dissolve and reintegrate themselves as part of the Somalilander state's new security and customs apparatus in the early post-Barre years, thereby convincing them to choose politics over violence as their way of life (Bradbury, Abokor, and Yusuf, 2003). The voice of the clans is later facilitated through the Guurti institution, as has been discussed in the previous section. Through this constant process of peacebuilding and compromise between the state and various interest groups in Somalilander society represented by the clans, the Somalilander state acknowledged the clans' broad support in the wider society and their ability to establish, or break, peace.

In its path to develop peace on its territory, the Somalilander government places an emphasis on egalitarian consensus-building mechanisms over coercive, violent mechanisms more prevalent in southern Somalia. The Somalilander state has been so successful in establishing peace within its territory (in contrast to Somalia's relative incapability in doing the same within its own territory) that 20 other states have *de facto* recognised Somaliland as a sovereign country and reliable partner in the region by acknowledging its diplomatic overtures and allowing the presence of Somaliland representative offices in their respective countries (Government of Somaliland, 2018).

Table 1

Foreign states hosting Somalilander diplomatic missions		
Africa		
Djibouti	Egypt	Ethiopia
Kenya	South Africa	South Sudan
Americas		
Canada	United States	
Asia		
Saudi Arabia	Taiwan	Turkey
United Arab Emirates	Yemen	
Europe		
Belgium	France	Netherlands
United Kingdom	Sweden	Norway
Oceania		
Australia		

Indeed, the Somalilander government acknowledges that international recognition is “the number one priority” for the government, and the homegrown democracy successfully nurtured in Somaliland to a large degree allows what the Somalilander government aspire to as their main goal: “claiming our rightful place in the community of nations” (Government of Somaliland, 2024).

As part of this lesson learned about particular, local patterns of homegrown democracy, unlike other African states that saw traditional clan institutions as incompatible with modern day statehood, the Somalilander state incorporated the clan system into its peacebuilding initiatives which it has successfully employed for the past three decades. Through this, the Somalilander state is largely inclusive and conciliatory, eager to extend the hand of justice and reconciliation to the clans through the implementation of customary laws (*xeer*) and sharia law instead of armed violence so prevalent in southern Somalia. This study terms this holistic approach on peacebuilding, involving traditional and religious institutions to encourage Somalilander citizens to resolve their disputes in amicable, legal ways, as the “Somalilander Way”. The use of the Somalilander Way has succeeded in bringing peace to Somaliland and ensuring that clan disputes can therefore be resolved in a conciliatory, amicable way, while also making sure that the central Somalilander government is in control of the security apparatus (instead of local interests or other non-state actors), which therefore allowed disputing parties to resolve their

differences in a relatively peaceful manner as they are incentivized to not use violence in their disputes.

Conclusions

Few would immediately conceive of "Somaliland" as a "strong" or "successful" state. However, as this study has shown, Somaliland has emerged as a beacon of light in an otherwise bleak region, where the internationally recognised Somali government has largely failed to build peace and development so much so that its effective control is restricted to its capital of Mogadishu. Although the Somaliland experiment was not born in a vacuum and was aided by neighbouring states Djibouti and Ethiopia, the fact remains that Somaliland's success should be attributed not to these external actors, but to the ingenuity of the Somaliland people and the strength of the Somaliland state in establishing control and promoting good governance so that everyone in Somaliland can enjoy a wholly participatory, vibrant democracy, a democracy that is successful because of the use of advantageous features of the Somaliland people's traditional customs and religion, rather than because of a Barre-style authoritarianism or naïve Somali-style imposition of liberal democracy. As Ingiriis (2021) so succinctly noted, while the externally driven state-building project in southern Somalia is about constructing shiny new buildings in Mogadishu, the Somaliland project is about transforming its society for the better, towards growth, development, and peace.

This study concedes that the Somaliland state-building-cum-peacebuilding project is still not perfect, and this piece is therefore not at all meant to be written as an ode to the present-day Somaliland state with all its outstanding deficiencies. In discussing the various issues still plaguing the Somaliland state, even the generally-optimistic Kaariye admits that there are still some problems, such as corruption within the Somaliland government, while Kosienkowski and Rudincova (2022) posit that there is still undue Ethiopian external influence in the internal management of the country that forms a roadblock to full sovereignty of the Somaliland state. Nevertheless, the fact remains that Somaliland is the only stable and dependable good actor, or dare this study propose, a good state actor in a chronically unstable region of the Horn of Africa otherwise filled with pirates, warlords, terrorists, dictatorships, or otherwise non-existent state structures. Unlike Somalia, whose government was conceived, formed, sponsored, and most importantly, kept barely alive for decades on end only thanks to the presence of security guarantees and the constant provision of economic assistance by foreign powers (namely Ethiopia and Djibouti), Somaliland has, over its three-decade history, evolved into a strong, largely independent sovereign state established and maintained by its own people according to their democratic ideals intertwined with the Somaliland society's traditional norms and customs.

In contrast to Somalia, where democracy was forced and continued to be propped up from outside, Somaliland's democracy is fully organic and homegrown from the needs and desires of the people of Somaliland. Somaliland's legitimacy as a state stems from its own people, who live in a vibrant respectful democracy, the best of its kind in the whole of the Horn of Africa, as contrasted to Somalia, whose state has no legitimacy other than that which is bestowed by the presence of foreign embassies and African Union forces keeping those embassies and other government buildings safe from the near-constant barrage of

Al-Shabaab terrorist attacks. Somaliland in the 21st century exists as a truly sovereign state in contrast to Somalia, which cannot even be considered as a state in the Weberian sense of monopoly of violence.

The extraordinary story of Somaliland demonstrates that conflict resolution in the Horn of Africa, and indeed in every other part of the world, does not require the usage of large armies and gun-wielding militias or columns of tanks and attack helicopters, but rather a spirit of mutual understanding imbued within a constant process of compromise and consensus directed by the guiding hand of a strong state.

This study therefore concludes that the role of a strong state is absolutely necessary to bring about growth, direct the pace of development, and establish peace within its territory in order to achieve long-term peace and prosperity for its citizens.

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